Description

Complementing traditional cellular networks with the option of integrated small cells and WiFi access points can be used to further boost the overall traffic capacity and service level. Small cells along with WiFi access points are projected to carry over 60 percent of all theglobal data traffic by 2015. With the integration of small cells on the radio access network levels, there is a focus on providing operators with more control over small cell selection while reducing the feedback burden. Altogether, these issues motivate the need for innovative distributed and autonomous association policies that operate on each user under the network operator’s control, utilizing only partial information, yet achieving near-optimal solutions for the network. In this paper, we propose a load-aware network selection approach applied to automated dynamic offset in heterogeneous networks (HetNets). In particular, we investigate the properties of a hierarchical (Stackelberg) Bayesian game framework, in which the macro cell dynamically chooses the offset about the state of the channel in order to guide users to perform intelligent network selection decisions between macro cell and small cell networks. We derive analytically the utility related to the channel quality perceived by users to obtain the equilibria, and compare it to the fully centralized (optimal), the full channel state information and the non-cooperative (autonomous) models. Building upon these results, we effectively address the problem of how to intelligently configure a dynamic offset which optimizes network’s global utility while users maximize their individual utilities. One of the technical contributions of the paper lies in obtaining explicit characterizations of the dynamic offset at the equilibrium and the related performances in terms of the price of anarchy. Interestingly, it turns out that the complexity of the algorithm for finding the dynamic offset of the Stackelberg model is Oð n4 Þ (where n is the number of users). It is shown that the proposed hierarchical mechanism keeps the price of anarchy almost equal to 1 even for a low number of users, and remains bounded above by the non-cooperative model.